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Comments 
THE POLITICS OF ESTABLISIHNG AN 
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT 
MICHAEL P. SCHARF* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Any substantive evaluation of the plan for an international 
criminal court requires first an understanding of the political currents 
that underlie the competing proposals. This piece briefly explores the 
politics of creating a permanent international criminal court. In 
particular, this comment examines three related issues: (1) the need 
for an international criminal court, (2) the political obstacles involved 
in creating such an institution, and (3) the prospects for success in 
light of these obstacles. 
II. THE NEED FOR A PERMANENT INTERNATIONAL 
CRIMINAL COURT 
There have been several published accounts of the evolution of 
the proposal for an international criminal court.1 All attest to the fact 
that, until recently, the proposal has had a long and largely disappoint-
ing history. With the creation of the International Tribunal for the 
* Assistant Professor of Law, New England School of Law; J.D., Duke University School 
of Law, 1988; A.B., Duke University, 1985; Attorney-Adviser, Office of the Legal Adviser, U.S. 
Department of State, 1989-1993. This comment is an expanded version of a speech delivered at 
a symposium on the Enforcement of Humanitarian Rights co-sponsored by Duke University and 
the University of Virginia law schools. 
1. See, e.g., VIRGINIA MORRIS AND MICHAEL P. SCHARF, AN INSIDER'S GUIDE TO THE 
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT FOR THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA 11-15 (1995); Paul D. 
Marquardt, Law Without Borders: the Constitutionality of an International Criminal Court, 33 
COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L LAW 73-148 (1995); Christopher L. Blakesley, Obstacles to the Creation 
of a Permanent War Crimes Tribunal, 18 FLETCHER F. WORLD AFF. 77-102 (1994); Benjamin 
B. Ferencz, An International Criminal Code and Court" Where They Stand and Where They're 
Going, 30 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L LAW 375-99 (1992); M. CherifBassiouni, The Time has Come 
for an International Criminal Court, 1 IND. lNT'L & COMP. L. REV. 1-43 (1991); Michael P. 
Scharf, The Jury Is Still Out on the Need for an International Criminal Court, 1 DUKE J. 
COMPAR. & INT'L L. 135, 137-46 (1991). 
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Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of 
International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of the 
Former Yugoslavia Since 1991 (the Tribunal) in 1993, however, the 
proposal's fortunes suddenly began to look up.2 
The Tribunal proved that the creation of a modern day interna-
tional criminal court was politically and juridically feasible. Having 
successfully, and quickly, tackled most of the same complex legal and 
practical issues that had been identified as barriers to a permanent 
international criminal court, the international community is left with 
little basis to justify continued delay in creating a permanent court. 
The creation of the Tribunal was said to serve five important 
goals, namely: (1) to deter future violations of international criminal 
law; (2) to break the endless cycle of ethnic violence and retribution 
and pave the way for reconciliation and peace; (3) to establish the 
historical record of atrocities before the guilty could reinvent the truth; 
( 4) to bring the guilty to justice and prosecute them in a fair manner; 
and (5) to serve as a model for future ad hoc tribunals or for a per-
manent international criininal court.3 
Yugoslavia, unfortunately, is not the only humanitarian tragedy 
of our time. There are a host of other situations around the world 
that also cry out for an international judicial response which would 
fulfill the five objectives of the Tribunal. Indeed, within a year of the 
creation of the Tribunal, the Security Council faced the mass tribal 
genocide of over 500,000 people in Rwanda. Comparing the scale of 
the crimes committed in Rwanda to Nazi Germany and Bosnia, 
Rwanda's prime minister-designate queried the United Nations 
Security Council, "[i]s it because we're Africans that a [similar] court 
has not been set up?"4 With this justifiable charge of Eurocentrism 
ringing through the Security Council, the Council was compelled to 
establish the International Criminal Tribunal for the Prosecution of 
Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of International Humani-
tarian Law Committed in the Territory of Rwanda (the Rwanda 
Tribunal). The Rwanda Tribunal has its own Trial Chambers but 
shares the Appeals Chamber and the Office of the Prosecutor of the 
2. See Michael P. Scharf, Getting Serious About an International Criminal Court, 6 PACE 
lNT'L L. REV. 103, 107 (1994). 
3. See MORRIS AND SCHARF, supra note 1, at 334, citing Andrew Kelly, U.N. Convenes 
Yugoslavia War Crimes Tribunal, Amid Doubts, Reuter's Eur. Comm. Rep., November 17, 1993, 
available in LEXIS, NEWS file, CURNWS Library. 
4. See MORRIS AND SCHARF, supra note 1, at 351 (citing Nelson Graves, Premier-Designate 
Compares Rwanda to Nazi Genocide, REUTERS WORLD SERVICE, May 26, 1994). 
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Yugoslavia Tribunal.5 
The creation of the Rwanda Tribunal showed that the machinery 
designed for the Yugoslavia Tribunal could be employed for other 
specific circumstances and offenses, thereby avoiding the need to 
reinvent the wheel in response to each global humanitarian crisis. 
Why then, one might inquire, has a tribunal not been set up for Iraq's 
violations of international humanitarian law committed during the 
Gulf War? After all, the Security Council had already condemned 
these violations, warning that individuals, as well as the Government 
of Iraq, would be liable for them, and called on Member States to 
submit information of Iraqi atrocities to the Council for further 
action.6 In light of the scale, brutality, and depravity of the continu-
ing violations of international humanitarian law, which occurred 
despite Security Council warnings, there would seem to be a moral 
imperative to attempt to bring responsible persons to justice before an 
international tribunal. At the very least, an international tribunal for 
Iraqi war crimes could help develop and preserve the historical record 
and express international outrage by issuing indictments. Yet, the 
Security Council shows no signs of taking such action; nor is there 
setious consideration of setting up a tribunal for the genocide in 
Cambodia, the terrorism committed by Libya, or the crimes against 
humanity committed in El Salvador, Haiti, and East Timor. 
There are several reasons why the Security Council has proven 
unwilling or unable to continue with the ad hoc approach that was 
employed for Yugoslavia and Rwanda. The first reason, which is 
sometimes referred to as "tribunal fatigue", is that the process of 
reaching a consensus on the tribunal's statute, electing judges, 
selecting a prosecutor, and appropriating funds has turned out to be 
extremely time consuming and politically exhausting for the members 
of the Security Council.7 Second, at least one permanent member of 
the Security Council-China-has openly expressed concern about 
using the Tribunal as precedent for the creation of other ad hoc 
criminal tribunals,8 perhaps out of fear that its own human rights 
5. S.C. Res. 955, U.N. SCOR, 49th Sess., 3453rd mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/955 (1994). 
6. S.C. Res. 674, U.N. SCOR, 45th Sess., 2951st mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/674 (1990). 
7. See MORRlS AND SCHARF, supra note 1, at 33-34 (explaining compromises necessary to 
gain support for the statute), 144-45 (describing difficulties in electing judges), 161-63 (discussing 
controversy in appointing the prosecutor). 
8. See MORRIS AND SCHARF, supra note 1, at 344 n.901 (quoting Statement of Mr. Li 
Zhaoxing (China), U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., 3217th mtg. at 33, U.N. Doc. S/PV.3217 (1993) 
(explaining China's position at the time of voting on Security Council Resolution 827, which 
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record might subject it to the proposed jurisdiction of such future 
international criminal courts. Third, many of the 183 countries that do 
not possess permanent membership and a veto in the Security Council 
view the creation of ad hoc tribunals by the Council as inherently 
unfair because the permanent members are likely to shield themselves, 
their friends and their allies from the jurisdiction of such tribunals, 
notwithstanding atrocities that may be committed within their own 
borders.9 The final reason for hesitance in creating additional ad hoc 
tribunals is economic: the expense of establishing tribunals10 is simply 
seen as too much for an organization whose budget is already 
stretched too thin. 
A permanent international criminal court is hailed by the majority 
of countries in the United Nations as the solution to the problems that 
plague the ad hoc approach. On December 9, 1994, the United 
Nations General Assembly adopted a resolution providing for the 
establishment of an intercessional committee to meet in April and 
August of 1995 to review the draft statute for an international criminal 
court, which was completed in 1994 by the International Law 
Commission, and to consider arrangements for the convening of an 
international conference of plenipotentiaries to adopt a statute.n 
Yet, most countries acknowledge that establishing a permanent 
institution is not desirable without the full support and leadership of 
the United States. There are several obstacles, however, that continue 
to prevent the United States from taking such action. 
III. DOMESTIC POLITICAL OBSTACLES 
During the past months, the United States has come light years 
from the position of the Bush administration, which had sought to 
prolong without progressing the debate on a permanent international 
criminal court. The Clinton administration is now trying to work with 
the international community to create a court that would be accept-
established the Yugoslavia Tribunal)). China later abstained on Security Council Resolution 955, 
supra note 5, which established the Rwanda Tribunal. 
9. Report of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Establishment of an International Criminal 
Court, U.N. GAOR, 49th Sess., Supp. No. 22, at paras. 120-25, U.N. Doc. A/50/22 (1995). 
10. The Yugoslavia Tribunal has an annual budget of some $39 million U.S. dollars. See 
MORRIS AND SCHARF, supra note 1 at 325-27. While running an international criminal justice 
system is expensive, this cost is not unreasonable when viewed in light of the cost of the U.N. 
peacekeeping force in the former Yugoslavia ($570 million U.S. dollars per year) or the UN 
peacekeeping force in Cambodia ($1.6 billion U.S. dollars per year). ld. at 323. 
11. G.A. Res. 49/53, U.N. GAOR, 49th Sess., Agenda Item 137, U.N. Doc. A/49/53 (1994). 
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able to the interests of both the executive and legislative branches of 
the U.S. government.12 
Within the executive branch, the State Department has been the 
most supportive among the government agencies.13 Within the State 
Department, the members of the U.S. Mission to the United Nations 
are probably the greatest supporters of an international criminal court, 
while members of the Office of the Legal Adviser continue to 
maintain a cautious attitude, which perhaps reflects a residual mistrust 
of international tribunals.14 The Departments of Justice and Trea-
sury are firmly opposed to any international criminal court that would 
have jurisdiction over narco-terrorists, reportedly out of concern that 
the establishment of an international criminal court would undermine 
the U.S. government's existing international law enforcement efforts 
and because, if those cases went to an international court, the 
departments would lose the sizable funds they now collect through 
asset forfeiture. 15 The Department of Defense, in turn, opposes any 
international criminal court that would have jurisdiction over war 
crimes unless the Security Council would have control over which 
situations would be within the jurisdiction of such a court. In this 
way, the United States could exercise its veto if U.S. forces or 
commanders were ever to be prosecuted before such a tribunal. 
The U.S. Congress, under the leadership of Newt Gingrich, 
Speaker of the House, and Jesse Helms, Chairman of the Senate 
Foreign Relations Committee, has all but declared war on the United 
Nations16 and appears to be in no mood to support the creation of 
another expensive international institution. The Clinton· administra-
tion simply cannot unilaterally represent U.S. intentions because any 
agreement creating an international criminal court would require 
congressional approval. Consequently, this administration has taken 
the position that it will support an international criminal court only if 
the court's jurisdiction is strictly limited to war crimes, genocide and 
12. United States Mission to the United Nations, Statement by the Honorable Conrad K. 
Harper, U.S. Special Advisor to the United Nations General Assembly in the Sixth Committee, 
U.N. GAOR, 48th Sess., Agenda Item 143, U.S. U.N. Press Release #171-(93) (1993), reprinted 
in Scharf, supra note 1, at 109. 
13. /d. at 105. 
14. /d. at 105 n.5. 
15. /d. 
16. See, e.g., The American Overseas Interests Act of 1995, H.R. 1561, 104th Cong. (1995) 
($100 million cut in contribution to U.N. peacekeeping); Foreign Relations Revitalization Act 
of 1995, H.R. 1561, 104th Cong. § 908 (1995) ($157 million cut in contribution to U.N. and other 
international organizations). 
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crimes against humanity, and if the court's jurisdiction can be triggered 
only by a decision of the Security Council.17 
IV. PROSPECTS FOR SUCCESS 
There are two potential outcomes in response to the new U.S. 
position. One is that the United States will fail in its efforts and the 
international community will proceed to establish a more ambitious 
international criminal court without U.S. participation. The second 
possibility is that the other countries of the world will reluctantly bow 
to the United States' wishes to create what essentially would be a 
Security Council-controlled permanent war crimes court. If the 
United States works as hard on this issue as it did to achieve favorable 
amendments to the Law of the Sea Treaty,18 this possibility, although 
far from a sure thing, is the more likely of the two outcomes. 
Moreover, the U.S. concept may be more palatable to countries such 
as the Caribbean nations that desire an international criminal court to 
prosecute drug traffickers and terrorists if they are able to supplement 
such a court with their own regional criminal courts. Such courts 
would have broader jurisdiction and would operate outside the control 
of the Security Council. 
As critical as the jurisdictional issue is, it is only the first step. A 
host of procedural issues also had to be addressed at the United 
Nations' intersessional meetings in March and August. 19 Generally, 
whether the permanent international criminal court's jurisdiction is 
expansive or restrictive, the most important thing is to create an 
17. See generally, Comments Received Pursuant to Paragraph 4 of the General Assembly 
Resolution 49/53 on the Establishment of An International Criminal Court, Report of the Secretary-
General, U.N. GAOR Ad Hoc Comm. on the Establishment of an Int'l Criminal Court, 
Addendum, at 7-29, U.N. Doc. NAC.244/1/Add.2 (1995) (setting forth the position of the 
Government of the United States of America on draft articles for a statute of an International 
Criminal Court). 
18. See Statement by U.S. Department of State, United States to Sign Seabed Mining 
Agreement: United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (Michael McCurry, spokesman, 
July 1, 1994), reprinted in B. CARTER AND P. TRIMBLE, INTERNATIONAL LAW at 1076-77 (2d 
ed. 1995). 
19. See Summary of the Proceedings of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Establishment of an 
International Criminal Court, U.N. Doc. A/AC.244/2 (April 21, 1995). The 85 U.N. delegations 
that participated in the intercessional meetings agreed to propose to the General Assembly that 
a procedure be established for drafting "a consolidated text of a convention for an International 
Criminal Court as a next step towards consideration by a conference of plenipotentiaries." 
Report of the Proceedings of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Establishment of an International 
Criminal Court, August 14-25, NGO Coalition for an International Criminal Court (August 27, 
1995). 
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institution that is both effective and fair. In this respect, prior to 
amendment, the original rules of procedure and evidence adopted by 
the Tribunal were criticized as creating an unlevel playing field 
favoring the prosecution over the defense.20 To paraphrase Justice 
Robert Jackson, Chief Prosecutor at Nuremberg, we must never forget 
that the record by which we judge defendants before an international 
tribunal today is the record on which history will judge us tomorrow. 
To pass them a poisoned chalice is to put it to our lips as well.21 
V. CONCLUSION 
On November 29, 1995, as this Article was going to press, the 
United Nations General Assembly Sixth Committee adopted by 
concensus the establishment of the an international criminal court. 
This resolution sets up a preparatory committee to prepare a "widely 
accepted consolidated text of a convention for an international 
criminal court as a next step towards consideration by a conference of 
plenipotentiaries. "22 
I concluded my speech at the symposium at Duke University Law 
School upon which this comment is based by quoting an old Chinese 
greeting, "[m]ay you live in interesting times," which seemed 
appropriate since the coming year should indeed prove most interest-
ing for those involved in the creation of a permanent international 
criminal court. After the speech, however, one of the other panelists, 
Cherif Bassiouni, who is known in academic circles for his mastery of 
ancient proverbs, whispered that this is not in fact a greeting, but 
rather a curse that the Chinese levy upon their enemies. Viewed in 
this light and given the difficult politics involved in creating a 
permanent international criminal court, the saying is perhaps even 
more fitting than originally intended. 
20. See Peter S. Canellos, Fairness is issue as war crimes tribunal addresses rape, BOST. 
GLOBE, June 4, 1995, at 22. 
21. THE TRIAL OF GERMAN MAJOR WAR CRIMINALS: PROCEEDINGS OF THE INTERNA-
TIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL SITTING AT NUREMBERG GERMANY, PART I 51 (His Majesty's 
Stationery Office, 1946). 
22. Establishment of an International Criminal Court, U.N. GAOR 6th Comm., 50th Sess., 
U.N. Doc. NC.6/50L.14 (1995). 
